At the post-secondary level (my level), there are so many issues with which we grapple. Student preparedness, entitlement, bureaucracy, social promotion, apathy, tenure pressures... it all sounds so negative despite the fact that there is much good being worked in America's colleges and universities. I do plan to discuss all of it or at least as much of it as I can. However, I've got a pet peeve when it comes to some of my peers. I've heard it from day one of graduate school from my mentors (grumbling around the coffee pots and water coolers) and I hear it now from faculty at many colleges who struggle with things like the adoption of common syllabi. I refer to the war cry of Academic Freedom, and following is an essay I wrote on the issue after Mike Adams' partial victory against UNC-Wilmington this past spring. I suppose this is as good as any place to launch this blog.
In the year 1590 or
thereabouts, as Galileo made his infamous treks up and down the campanile at
the University at Pisa carrying two small cannonballs to test Aristotle’s
theory of the speed with which objects of differing weights fall, he likely did
so in robes and sandals. He likely lectured in such a habit also, his academic
regalia, as European universities had almost uniformly adopted a code of dress
for faculty, requiring their distinction from students by degree-dress. These
would be the very same robes we tend to dust off for Founder’s Day celebrations
and December and May graduation days. The history lesson remains a valuable
tool for remembering our roots as academics.
When we become professors,
we don a mantle of expertise and embark upon a career of professing. We teach and do research. A presumption is made that
professors, as a body, contain within themselves a corpus of knowledge either
needed or desired (or both) by the student body we serve and, further, that we
have the tools and desire to disseminate that knowledge in a pedagogical manner
conducive to learning. This mantle can be likened to any number of metaphorical
symbols, but in the current litigious climate of the United States, one of the
most common and fallacious seems to be a cloak of infinite protection.
Let us begin at the
beginning and hopefully come full circle by the end.
College and university
professors in America are not guaranteed, nor are they protected by, anything
called “academic freedom.” This phrase has become so pervasive in the popular
media that we hardly go a week without reading a news article or hearing a
public radio broadcast relating to this court case or that tenure promotion
somehow turning on academic freedom. There exist more detailed reviews of the litigation
surrounding academic freedom in the United States than I shall provide here (see
Standler, 2000), but until April 2011, no court – high or low – had ruled in
any way favoring faculty on the issue. The Supreme Court, however, in Sweeny v. New Hampshire (1957) ruled
clearly that academic freedom is reserved for institutions. Further, the Court specified that this academic
freedom granted institutions the right to determine the following four
elements:
•
Who
would be taught at their schools
•
What
would be taught
•
Who
would teach that content
•
And
how that content would be taught.
In no legal case is academic
freedom, as such, awarded to a faculty member. From time to time, Justice David
Souter of the United States Supreme Court loosely quotes Justice Brennan and
refers to the term as a special consideration of the First Amendment. However,
in the handful of cases where academic freedom is specifically defined (see Keyshian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 603 (1967), Pickering v. Board of
Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)) cases
uniformly reference Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), the case that gave us the institutional
definition cited above. There is no special “academic freedom” for faculty
outside the normal purview of the First Amendment protections granted to all
citizens of the United States. As Judge Agee of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals wrote in the majority opinion for Adams
v. University of North Carolina-Wilmington in April 2011, the Supreme Court has not
established ‘a First Amendment right of academic freedom that belongs to the
professor as an individual,’ but rather ‘to the extent [the Supreme Court] has
constitutionalized a right of academic freedom at all, [it] appears to have
recognized only an institutional right of self-governance in academic affairs’”
(Regents of the University of Michigan v.
Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985)).
We should pause to consider what this means. As professors, are we
not then accorded the privilege, the duty, of expressing ourselves – fully
including our perspectives on social, ideological, and moral topics – both
inside and outside the classroom? I’ll start with the equivocal psychologist’s
response to every yes/no question: it
depends. For certain, as citizens of the United States, we are duly
protected in the content of our speech under the First Amendment. Pickering (1968) offers the clearest,
and most legally sound, explanation. Faculty can speak their minds on any issue
at any time in any open forum, including criticism of their own administrations
without fear of reprisal from their employers so long as they are doing so as
private citizens speaking on matters of public concern. This is the concept of
free speech as we have always known it. We can also advance causes, address
student inequities, and pursue agenda related to faculty concerns so long as
they fall within the scope of one’s college or university service. What we
should note clearly at this junction is that having been granted the right of
free speech, “academic freedom” as an expression thereof for institutional
faculty becomes redundant.
Let’s return to Judge Agee, who pinpoints the real issue at hand.
Agee refers again to Pickering but
also to Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138 (1983) in discussion of whether a faculty member is a public employee who,
at the time of his speech, is a private citizen speaking on a matter of public
concern or a paid employee speaking on a matter of private concern. Exercising
our free speech rights under First Amendment protections illustrates the
former. What about the latter? Classroom teaching, for example, or committee
membership and other forms of college or university service that exist within
the bounds of the ivory tower? These may, and often do, fall within the scope
of a public employee speaking on matters of private concern. As such, they are
not necessarily protected speech. Judge Agee wrote, “The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that the government may impose certain restraints on its employees'
speech and take action against them that would be unconstitutional if applied
to the general public” (Adams v.
UNC-Wilmington) and further quoted Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d at 406 (2000), “[T]he
state, as an employer, undoubtedly possesses greater authority to restrict the
speech of its employees than it has as sovereign to restrict the speech of the
citizenry as a whole.”
In short, we are not guaranteed carte blanche to say or do what we
like in the classroom or elsewhere on our campuses. The more important
question, from my perspective, is why do we need this cloak of infinite
protection? Of what are we afraid? In point of fact, I would assert that the
time has come to cast off our illusions regarding the notion of academic
freedom and critically examine the reasons we might wish to toss it into the
Goodwill pile altogether. Aside from the obvious conclusion that the United
States Supreme Court has multiple times granted all academic freedom to
institutions rather than individuals, let’s consider the following:
Entitlement by Virtue of
Purpose. Academics, broadly, serve three functions. We teach. We
conduct research. We do both. The American Association of University Professors’
(AAUP) comments on academic freedom begin with these two remarks on teaching
and scholarship.
1.
Teachers are entitled to full
freedom in research and in the publication of the results, subject to the
adequate performance of their other academic duties; but research for pecuniary
return should be based upon an understanding with the authorities of the
institution.
2.
Teachers are entitled to
freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject, but they should be
careful not to introduce into their teaching controversial matter which has no
relation to their subject. Limitations of academic freedom because of religious
or other aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the
time of the appointment.
The final statement on academic freedom by the AAUP focuses both
institutional and individual attention on free speech. The AAUP reminds
institutions that faculty are citizens with First Amendment protections.
Concurrently, faculty are reminded that “their special position in the
community imposes special obligations” and “they should remember that the
public may judge their profession and their institution by their utterances”
(AAUP Policy, 2006, p.3). Constitutionally then we are protected in our speech
as are all citizens, yet we remain responsible by virtue of our positions for
our speech. To some degree, that should be true of all citizens, and I suppose
it is.
Responsibility by Virtue of Purpose. Before any of us cry,
“Academic freedom!” in response to some perceived institutional constriction, I
believe it’s helpful to pause and reflect on our professional purpose. As
scholars, our charge is to advance our respective fields in our academic
pursuits. We may wear the mantle of expertise, but we don’t yet wear the laurel
wreath. At best, we’ve garnered a well formed twig. Referring back to the
AAUP’s remarks, the organization supports the notion of faculty freedom in the
pursuit and publication of knowledge in their fields. Although no great
illumination issues forth from this statement, we can reasonably surmise the
AAUP doesn’t wish faculty to stray too far abreast of their training; nor do
they wish administrations to stymie the efforts of their faculty scholars.
Teaching
professors remain a different breed of academic, as they have always been, the
teacher-scholar model more popular in the United States. I’ll address the
latter first. If a scholar teaches in order to engage in scholarship (i.e., the
job requires undergraduate teaching but affords research or requires research
in addition to teaching for tenure), then faculty likely haven’t been trained
or at least not trained well as classroom instructors. Further, faculty
perception seems to permeate institutions of higher learning that the same
autonomy exists in the classroom as exists in the laboratory, and this is as
much a fallacy as the transmogrified mantle of academia into the cloak of
infinite protection. Students pay institutions tuition for the purpose of
earning some form of credential, generally a diploma. Institutions, generally,
pay into a regional or national system of accreditation allowing those
credentials to be considered worthy of the time and financial resources
invested on the part of the student. Institutions, both public and private, that
are accredited have not only the right but the obligation to ensure standards
are met in such areas as their general education core curricula and also in
individual courses. What are students supposed to be learning? Are they
learning those things? And how do institutions know whether or not students
are? When an institution enacts a policy change such as adopting a common
syllabus and/or textbook for a general education core curriculum course, this
in no way infringes upon the academic freedom of the teaching professor or
teacher-scholar. The institution is
constitutionally granted the right to determine what is taught and how it is to
be taught, and by virtue of his or her appointment at the institution, the
faculty member is obligated to teach that content in the manner the
institution’s policy deems most beneficial to students. Can this rankle faculty
who teach in order to engage in their
scholarship? Sure, but it isn’t an issue of academic freedom.
Teaching professors, as stated previously, are a special category of
academic. They wear the same mantle of expertise as scholar professors, but
their professional purpose is to educate the young mind. These faculty operate
under the same restrictions, if any exist, in their employing institutions as
teacher-scholars; yet, those
restrictions may rub in distinct ways. Is it not the duty of the sociology
professor to engage students in discussions of current, often controversial
subject matter, matter often protected by free speech provisions? Absolutely.
What is not “duty” but, rather, skirts the ethical bounds of the teaching professor’s
relationship with his or her students is the introduction of material “which
has no relation to their subject” (AAUP Policy, 2006, p.3). Here we have a
dilemma. It is not relevant to a discussion on poverty or abortion or
homosexuality in a class on one of these topics what my views on poverty or abortion or homosexuality are? By its very
nature, the role of “professor” conveys authority and power, and students are
subject to the effects of that role. The responsibilities of faculty are to inform,
to open students to new avenues of thought, to make of them critical thinkers
and problem solvers capable of entertaining multiple perspectives and not
simply adopting the professor’s as many will do as soon as they know what that
is. The classroom is not the place for such self-disclosure nor does it contain
the appropriate audience. Any claim to academic freedom protections for free
speech in that venue is laughable at best.
If we believe in our professional purpose – to advance our fields
through scholarship, to advance the knowledge of students in our fields, or to
do some combination of these two things – then it is clear our professional
obligations are to conduct sound research, to produce good literature or art,
to challenge young thinkers, to disseminate knowledge… and not to pursue a personal
agenda in the private forum that is the lecture hall. Further, the cloak of
infinite protection, “academic freedom,” with regard to teaching method or
style or in the choice of content delivered dazzles us with its illusory
truths. We should wish to fulfill our obligation to impart actual knowledge in
the classroom as opposed to advocating our alleged right to teach whatever
however we wish. Ample room exists in the lecture hall for the pedagogical
differences comprising our own unique styles without resorting to the cloak of
infinite protection.
Equality in the Workplace. Free speech protections on
the job (and often off the clock as well) with regard to academia have been
addressed only so far as governmental employees are concerned. That is, there
are no constitutional protections in place for faculty at privately run
institutions. If faculty are presumed to have this “academic freedom” as a
special consideration of the First Amendment, it should logically follow that
all faculty at all American institutions of higher learning deserve the same
considerations. They do not. Martyrdom may not be de rigueur, but I find it interesting that academic freedom
lawsuits flow almost exclusively from the streams of public institutions.
While we ponder
that ignoble truth, let’s try a little exercise. Stand up. Go on; I’ll wait.
Walk to your closet and open the door. No, not that one. The one where your
robes hang shoved at the back awaiting May graduation. Pull them out. Put on
your tam or your hood. Better yet, put on the whole thing. Remember your
hooding ceremony. Feel the weight of the mantle on your shoulders. There. Isn’t
that better than a non-existent cloak? Perhaps Galileo’s fellows had it right
after all.
Please refer to the post on the
House Rules if you are unsure of how to comment. Thank you.